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Abstract 
 
In spite of the significance assigned to the idea of ‘tacit knowledge’ in recent literature, there 
is no consensus as to precisely what is meant by the term. Moreover, the current interest in 
the tacit aspects of knowledge has tended to divert attention from the economically much 
more obvious significance of its converse, explicit or articulated knowledge, and, by implica-
tion, the importance of articulation, the process through which tacit skills and knowledge are 
made explicit. This paper addresses both of these problems.   
   
The paper analyzes the relationship between economically significant skills and capabilities 
and the various types of knowledge that inform them. Based on a taxonomy of knowledge, 
historical and present day examples are used to illustrate the significance of articulation – the 
process whereby tacit knowledge becomes articulated – and codification – the process of ren-
dering articulated knowledge in fixed, standardized and easily replicable form. 
 
The model is applied in a discussion of the incentives that induce epistemic communities to 
articulate their knowledge. It is argued that with two major exceptions – social skills and 
creativity – most forms of economically relevant knowledge can be articulated. Whether or 
not articulation will take place will be determined by the expected benefits, the value attached 
to these benefits and by the cost and effort required. The benefits include (1) the speeding up 
of innovation and knowledge creation, (2) advantages associated with division of labor, and 
(3) improved capabilities for replication and control. The costs depend on the availability of 
suitable codes, theories and tools.  
 
Emphasizing the roles of different kinds of epistemic communities as the locales where 
knowledge resides and as agents of articulation and knowledge creation, the paper outlines a 
number of theoretical implications regarding the role of knowledge – tacit and otherwise – for 
the competitiveness of firms and in ‘knowledge based’ versions of the theory of the firm. 
 
(Tacit knowledge; Articulation; Epistemic communities) 
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The current, and justified, fascination with the tacit component of knowledge... must 
not cloud the fact that organizations to a large extent are ‘articulation machines,’ built 
around codified practices and deriving some of their competitive advantages from 
clever, unique articulation. In fact, much of industrialization seems to have entailed 
exactly the progressive articulation of craftsman-like skills, difficult but not impossi-
ble to codify.” (Hedlund 1994, p. 76) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In a whole range of areas, including strategy, organization, knowledge management, science 
policy and others, ‘tacit knowledge’ has become a fashionable brand of snake oil, invoked to 
explain an increasingly wide and disparate range of phenomena, both merely hypothetical 
ones and ones actually observed. However, in reviewing the literature the reader is struck by 
the extreme conceptual ambiguity, theoretical confusion and lack of agreement characteristic 
of the way the term is being used:  As noted by Cowan et al. (2000), in an interesting critique 
of this fact: 
[M]ore than having become merely another overly vague bit of fashionable economic 
jargon, ‘tacit knowledge’ now is an increasingly ‘loaded’ buzzword, freighted with 
both methodological implications for microeconomic theory in general, and policy 
significance for the economics of science and technology, innovation, and economic 
growth. (Cowan et al. 2000, p. 212) 
Moreover, the present interest in the tacit aspects of knowledge has tended to divert attention 
from the economically much more obvious significance of its converse, explicit or articulated 
knowledge, and, by implication, the importance of articulation, the process through which 
tacit skills and knowledge are made explicit. Heeding Gunnar Hedlund’s advice in the epi-
graph, this paper shares with Cowan et al. 2000 the ambition to redress this imbalance. 
 
Given the lack of agreement in the literature, the first aim of this paper is to formulate a logi-
cal and consistent set of definitions of the central concepts involved: the distinction between 
‘tacit’ and ‘explicit’ knowledge and the nature of ‘articulation’ – the process through which 
the former can be transformed into the latter. The second aim is to model the structures and 
mechanisms that allow epistemic communities  – through articulation – to develop new skills 
and create new knowledge, to discuss the conditions under which articulation is likely to oc-
cur and to outline some of its consequences. The overall objective is to contribute towards the 
formulation of a coherent framework for describing and analyzing organizational knowledge 
structures  and to outline some of its theoretical implications.  
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THE NATURE OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE 
In the two decades since Nelson and Winter (1982) brought Polanyi’s notion of ‘tacit knowl-
edge’ to the attention of economists, the concept has – as Cowan et al. point out – come to 
enjoy a “wonderful new career”:  
…[A] notion that took its origins in the psychology of visual perception and human 
motor skills has been wonderfully transmuted, first from an efficient mode of mental 
storage of knowledge into a putative epistemological category… from there into a 
phenomenon of inarticulable inter-organizational relationships and finally to one of 
the keys to corporate, and perhaps also national, competitive advantage! (Cowan et al. 
2000, p. 223) 
In the process, the nuanced treatment in the original discussion (Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Chapter 4) has been lost and the profession has failed to even approach consensus as to the 
terminology and its conceptual basis.  
 
‘Tacit knowledge’, it is generally agreed, is revealed through application and cannot be writ-
ten down. However, regarding the possibility of transforming – articulating – tacit knowledge 
into explicit knowledge, there is no such convergence of views. According to Grant and 
Baden-Fuller (1995, p. 18), for example, ‘tacit knowledge’ is “by definition” not capable of 
articulation. In a similar vein, Reed and DeFillippi (1990, p. 89) define ‘tacitness’ as “the im-
plicit and uncodifiable accumulation of skills that result from learning by doing.” (Italics 
added.) Other writers define ‘tacit knowledge’ as knowledge that is ‘difficult’ to articulate, 
but the conditions under which this is possible and desirable remain obscure:  
Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is not codified. If it could be codified, then it 
would no longer be tacit knowledge; it would have become explicit knowledge. It is 
possible to convert some tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge… but much tacit 
knowledge is difficult, if not impossible, to codify and can never be made explicit. 
(Berman et al. 2002, p. 14) 
Wagner and Sternberg (1985) avoid the issue altogether: “By tacit, we refer to knowledge 
that usually is not openly expressed or stated… [W]e do not mean to imply that this knowl-
edge is inaccessible to conscious awareness, unspeakable, or unteachable, but merely that it is 
not taught directly…” (Wagner and Sternberg 1985, pp. 438 f.). 
 
Taking a slightly different approach, Grant (1996a, p. 111) identifies “knowing how with 
tacit knowledge and knowledge about facts and theories with explicit knowledge.” He does 
not seem to exclude the possibility of articulation: “If tacit knowledge cannot be codified… 
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its transfer between people is slow, costly and uncertain.” (Italics added.) This suggests that 
tacit “knowing how” can be codified into explicit “knowledge about facts and theory” but the 
implications of such a transformation are unclear. Can knowledge be tacit and explicit at the 
same time or does ‘knowing how’ disappear in the process? 
 
In fact, the curious idea that articulation ‘destroys’ knowledge is not uncommon in the lit-
erature. Soo et al. (2002, p. 131) provide one of its more extreme expressions: “True knowl-
edge”, they claim, is “by definition” non-codified. “As soon as it becomes codified and 
transmittable it ceases to be knowledge and becomes data.” 
 
Although not so specific about the precise mechanisms, Kreiner (2002) seems to have some-
thing similar in mind: 
To transform [through articulation and codification] tacit knowledge into company 
property is a legitimate managerial goal. It makes good sense to find ways of taking 
care of the knowledge that leaves the company at night. But simply put, the less 
knowledge that leaves in the evening, the less knowledge returns in the morning. 
(Kreiner 2002, p. 21)   
The examples of ‘tacit knowledge’ given in the literature typically refer to simple motor 
skills, such as swimming, bicycle riding or tennis – far removed from the type of skills likely 
to provide competitive advantage to firms. More economically relevant examples are rare, 
although Subramaniam and Venkatraman (2001, p. 362), for example, present as a ‘tacit in-
sight’ the fact that U.S. consumers tend to snack while using the telephone. (Discovering this 
intriguing “tacit habit” of soiling cordless phones is said to have offered Sony a “unique 
innovation opportunity”.) 
 
In spite of their various interpretations as to its precise nature, most writers concur that ‘tacit 
knowledge’ is an important source of competitive advantage. The notion is based on the 
belief that tacit knowledge is difficult to imitate and has become popular because of its neat 
fit into the prevailing ‘resourced based view’ of strategy. Following Winter (1987), the idea is 
often combined with its converse, i.e. explicit knowledge is by nature easily imitated and can 
therefore only provide momentary advantage. The conclusion commonly made is that it is 
easier to appropriate the returns to tacit than to codified knowledge.  
 
Since ‘tacitness’ is typically associated with a lack of understanding, this train of thought 
often comes perilously close to identifying ignorance as a means to sustainable competitive 
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advantage. Reed and DeFillippi (1990, p. 91) note, for example, that “… tacitness generates 
ambiguity through the skilled operator’s own level of unawareness of the actions that he or 
she undertakes.” Normatively, they suggest (p. 98), “…reinvestment in ambiguity should be 
aimed at competencies on which advantage is based and from which ambiguity is derived.”      
 
As noted by Hedlund and Zander (1993) almost a decade ago, the root of the problem is that 
‘tacitness’…    
… is defined as a negation of something in itself undefined. It is posed as that which 
is not articulated, articulable, codified or codifiable. As in all cases of negative defini-
tions, the risk is that a heterogeneous assemblage of aspects is subsumed under one 
label. One gets the distinct feeling that authors take refuge in tacitness largely because 
they have encountered something they do not understand. (Hedlund and Zander 1993, 
p. 12) 
The confusion has undoubtedly been added to also by the curious inability of the English 
language to easily distinguish between ‘substantial knowledge’ – ‘know that’ and ‘know 
why’ (Wissen, savoir-connaître) – and ‘procedural knowledge’ – know-how (Können, savoir-
faire). Although the distinction is often emphasized, the nature of the simple relation between 
the two is generally overlooked or obscured by ill-chosen metaphors.  
 
For Polanyi, whose main interest is a critique of positivist theory of science, the difference is 
not very significant: “These two aspects of knowing have similar structure and neither is ever 
present without the other... I shall always speak of ‘knowing’ therefore, to cover both practi-
cal and theoretical knowledge” (Polanyi 1966, p. 7). 
 
However, failure to make this distinction obscures the fact that skills and substantive knowl-
edge have different characteristics and economic implications. Substantial knowledge serves 
to inform the exercise of a skill:  “I can add these numbers because I know (and understand) a 
few simple rules of arithmetic.” “I can find my way to Piccadilly Circus because I know the 
map of London (and understand the codes and conventions necessary to interpret maps).” It 
derives its economic significance through application in the performance of an economically 
meaningful activity, i.e. the exercise of a skill.  
 
This is not to say that all skills are reducible to a set of rules and ‘knowings-that’ (Ryle, 
1945-1946). Polanyi’s notion of ‘tacit knowledge’ is based on the observation that, at times, 
skills can be exercised without the performer being able to easily and fully account for their 
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cognitive basis. (I can ride a bicycle but I cannot explain why.) This unarticulated cognitive 
foundation cannot be directly observed, but may, he claims, be inferred when “...the aim of a 
skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as 
such by the person observing them” (Polanyi 1962, p. 49, italics in the original).  
 
Importantly, skills vary in (1) the degree to which their exercise relies on articulable knowl-
edge, (2) the degree to which such articulable knowledge has, in fact, been articulated, and 
(3) the cost, effort and means that would be required to increase the degree of articulation. 
     
--- INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
Accepting – without going into the underlying epistemological assumptions – Plato’s classi-
cal definition of ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’1, it appears that three types of cognitive 
(as opposed to procedural) knowledge can be distinguished: (1) explicit knowledge, (2) inter-
nalized knowledge (i.e. articulated knowledge of which the agent is not focally aware), and 
(3) tacit knowledge (Figure 1). The three types of knowledge are complementary and – to 
varying degrees – most economically relevant capabilities draw on all three. 
 
Explicit Knowledge 
Explicit knowledge is conventionally divided into ‘know-what’, i.e. information, knowledge 
of facts, etc., and ‘know-why’, knowledge of principles, theory, causalities and the like. It is 
with the aid of the latter that we interpret or ‘give meaning to’ the former; data without refer-
ence to cognitive schemata are meaningless.   
 
A very large portion of the time spent in formal education programs is devoted to the teach-
ing and (in smaller portion) learning explicit knowledge. In modern societies, professional 
work is unthinkable without substantial knowledge, but the same is true for many everyday 
activities also.  
 
One important class of explicit knowledge is knowledge of codes and symbols. Together with 
knowledge of associated theory, mastery of codes is an important determinant of an agent’s 
‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).     
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Internalized Knowledge 
Over time, both in professional and everyday life, much of the explicit knowledge informing 
our activities become (with practice and habit) so ‘natural’ or ‘commonplace’ that they 
escape conscious attention. Such ‘internalized knowledge’ forms a second category of 
knowledge. (Nonaka 1991; Hedlund and Nonaka 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Hedlund 
1994). Internalization economizes on limited cognitive, perceptual and coordinative re-
sources, in the process transforming deliberate behavior into routines (Hedlund 1994; March 
& Simon 1958). Internalized knowledge informs an agent’s capabilities without being in her 
focal awareness (Polanyi, 1962).  
 
Internalization is often a prerequisite for proficiency (Sternberg and Horvath 1999). It some-
times takes considerable time to accomplish and may therefore have scarcity value. But in 
many other instances – driving an automobile, for example – the time and effort required are 
usually quite modest. Although the skill of pizza makers to hand toss pizza dough tends to 
increase with experience (Argote 1999, p. 69), the economic significance of this fact is 
probably limited.   
 
Internalized knowledge shares many of the characteristics of ‘tacit knowledge’ and to an out-
side observer, the difference may be difficult to detect (Cowan et al., p. 232).2 But if 
prompted to do so, a person drawing on such knowledge is able – oftentimes with ease, 
sometimes only with difficulty – to explicate the rules underlying her performance.   
 
Inarticulable Tacit Knowledge 
The third category, ‘tacit knowledge’, includes, on the one hand, ‘truly tacit’, i.e. ‘inarticu-
lable knowledge’; and, on the other, ‘articulable tacit knowledge’ – knowledge that could be 
but has not (yet) been articulated. In the present context, this is clearly the most interesting 
category and it will provide the focus for most of the following discussion. First, however, a 
few words should be spent on ‘truly tacit’, i.e. inarticulable knowledge, a subject on which 
the inherited literature displays much confusion and widely divergent opinions.             
 
As a rule – although this is rarely spelled out – tacit knowledge is taken to apply to acquired 
skills – it does not include ‘natural’ human faculties, such as sense perception, use of gram-
mar and walking upright without losing balance.3 It is striking, however, that many of the 
examples of ‘tacit knowledge’ offered by Polanyi (and the ones most often quoted) – such as 
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the motor skills of riding a bicycle or swimming – refer to capabilities closely relying on in-
herited, neurologically determined faculties. Their successful performance requires speed and 
simultaneity of information processing. The learner must work out the detailed muscular co-
ordination by himself, perhaps (like an apprentice) with the help and encouragement of 
someone mastering the art (Hedlund and Zander 1993, p. 10). These sorts of skills are ‘inar-
ticulable’ in ways similar to natural faculties. Polanyi’s explication of bicycle riding, for ex-
ample, explains the relevant physical principles, but it is not very helpful for anyone wishing 
to master the art:  
The rule observed by the cyclist is this. When he starts falling to the right he turns the 
handlebars to the right, so that the course of the bicycle is deflected along a curve to-
wards the right. This results in a centrifugal force pushing the cyclist to the left and 
offsets the centrifugal force dragging him down to the right. This manæuvre presently 
throws the cyclist out of balance to the left, which he counteracts by turning the han-
dlebars to the left; and so he continues to keep himself in balance by winding along a 
series of appropriate curvatures. A simple analysis shows that for a given angle of un-
balance the curvature of each winding is inversely proportional to the square of the 
speed as which the cyclist is proceeding. (Polanyi 1962, p. 49) 
Polanyi’s explication parallels the optical and neurological principles of eyesight articulated 
by the medical profession. Although in many ways useful, they are as irrelevant to the capa-
bility of seeing as knowledge of inertial forces and Newton’s first law to the art of bicycling.  
 
Sight and other natural human faculties are not accessible to consciousness and are therefore 
tacit. They can be theoretically explained but not articulated in ways that are instrumental to 
their exercise. Their analysis, although significant in areas such as neurology, linguistics and 
philosophy, fall outside the realm of economic enquiry.  
 
This seems to be the line of reasoning underlying the claim by Cowan et al. (2000, p. 230), 
that inarticulable knowledge is “not very interesting for the social sciences.” However, this 
statement is clearly too rash. There are at least two (and possibly more) important types of 
economically significant skills that are largely based on inarticulable, ‘truly tacit’ knowledge: 
social skills and creativity.  
 
Social skills. The basis for social skills – here taken to include a wide range of capa-
bilities such as management and leadership skills, ability to work in groups, motivate others, 
negotiating, selling, etc. – is typically formed during adolescence and early childhood.  Later 
in life, experience can provide tacit knowledge regarding, for example, how to manage one-
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self, manage others or manage ones career (Wagner and Sternberg 1985). Such knowledge is 
hardly ever acquired through formal training. Educational programs, courses and seminars 
can only with marginal effect (if at all) hope to develop and strengthen social skills. To the 
extent that they do, they are typically based on methods of instruction emphasizing practical 
exercises and emulating the interaction between master and apprentice. Explication is typi-
cally of little avail. Etiquette can perhaps be learnt through the study of appropriate books; 
the skills associated with charm, charisma and a winning personality cannot be acquired in 
this way. 
 
Creativity. Creativity, the ability to frame problems and to conceive of and do new 
things, is a further inarticulable skill (Leonard and Sensiper 1998). This applies equally to 
scientific discovery, the engineer’s conception of a new design or the entrepreneur’s identi-
fication of a new business opportunity as it does to the creation of an original work of art. 
Interestingly, articulation of tacit knowledge is often itself a creative activity, based at least 
partly on skills that are themselves inarticulable.  
 
In science, there is a fundamental difference between the logic of discovery and the logic of 
demonstration. Articulation and codification constitute the very essence of the latter; discov-
ery, at least in the true sense of finding something ‘totally’ new, cannot be codified. The skill 
of discovery – like other creative talent – cannot be prescribed and codified. This is not to 
preclude, of course, that – given the right circumstances – it can – as other types of tacit 
knowledge – be passed on from master to apprentice: “…[T]he scientist must be an accom-
plished craftsman; he must have undergone a lengthy apprenticeship, learning how to do 
things without being able to appreciate why they work” (Ravetz 1971/1996, pp. 14-15). 
 
The argument can also be phrased differently. In all articulation, some of the perceptual tex-
ture and ‘richness’ of the original knowledge is inevitably lost (Boisot and Child 1988, p. 
508). Sometimes, this loss has serious consequences.4 Truly creative skills, such as those of 
art, music or cooking, can only be codified with extreme loss of quality. This is why the 
‘music’ produced by electric pianos is so far from the real thing as are the hamburgers of 
McDonald’s from a visit to Tour d’Argent.  
 
Like all tacit knowledge, creative skills only develop slowly and with difficulty. The art of 
composing music has certainly developed since the 18th century, but Mozart’s is as distinctive 
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today as in his own lifetime. And it appears improbable that today’s chefs are much superior 
to the ones preparing the banquets for the imperial court of his time. Technical progress is 
today more rapid than in the past, not because present day innovators are more creative than 
those of the past, but because they have access to a vastly expanded range of articulated 
knowledge.     
 
Articulable Tacit Knowledge   
At any moment in time, the boundaries between the inarticulable and the articulable are 
determined by the availability of appropriate codes. It is therefore difficult to differentiate 
precisely between skills that cannot be articulated, as a matter of principle, and those that 
cannot be so because appropriate codes are not (yet) available.  
 
This is especially the case where – in the absence of suitable inducements – no attempts at 
theoretical articulation have been undertaken. Many tacit skills that are easily learnt by trial-
and-error or a short period of apprenticeship do not warrant the cost of codification. That 
such activities remain also in very modern production plants is sometimes taken as evidence 
of the special (almost mystical) significance of ‘tacit’ skills. In reality, the fact that these 
skills have not yet been articulated is more often a sign of their relative lack of economic 
importance. 
The fact that in order to proficiently execute a standardized, well articulated produc-
tive practice workers need some experience, some assimilation of the sequence of acts 
they must perform etc., or that even in maneuvering a joystick some tacit personal 
knowledge is involved, does not seem to merit much attention from an economic 
viewpoint. (Balconi 1997, p. 23) 
Indeed, with the exceptions noted above, it seems that most tacit skills of economic interest 
are at least potentially articulable. These include a large range of experience-based knowl-
edge, informing, for example, engineering design and many manufacturing activities. Expli-
cation of such knowledge has profound economic, social and political effects. The conditions 
that induce articulation, the mechanisms through which it takes place and its effects are topics 
well worthy of study. 
 
Articulation and Codification 
In the following, ‘articulation’ will be taken to denote the process of expressing tacit knowl-
edge into some socially shared code or symbolic representation – in the simplest case, ordi-
nary natural language. However, it is useful to maintain a distinction between ‘articulation’ 
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and ‘codification.’ While recognizing that the definitions are somewhat arbitrary and that 
other writers may prefer other usages, I propose to let ‘codification’ denote the expression of 
knowledge in a standardized, fixed form.5  
 
Of course, ‘standardization’ and ‘fixity’ are not absolute criteria but relative and context 
dependent. The borderline between codified and non-codified explicit knowledge is some-
times fluent. Engineering designs, for example, are often first articulated in the form of 
‘thinking sketches’ (Ferguson 1992/2001, p. 96 f.) and it may be difficult to precisely deter-
mine where on the way to the final engineering drawing ‘codification’ has taken place. Digi-
tal documents, such as Web pages have less fixity than those printed on paper (Brown and 
Duguid 2000).  
 
Adopting this semantic convention, ‘codification’ presupposes ‘articulation’ but knowledge 
can be ‘articulated’ without being ‘codified’ and not all uncodified knowledge is tacit. The 
distinction is important both for theory and for managerial practice. It is through codification 
that knowledge becomes embedded in transferable artifacts that can be moved over long dis-
tances, often at minimal cost. Transmission of articulated but uncodified knowledge – like 
tacit knowledge – can typically be accomplished only by means of some type of personal 
contact.  
 
Articulation and codification sometimes take place nearly simultaneously, but since codifica-
tion may require additional time and resources this is not always the case. One of the classic 
problems in the implementation of ‘knowledge management’ systems is how to create incen-
tives for employees to spend the time and energy necessary to codify and document their 
knowledge in ways that allow it to be stored and accessed (Soo et al. 2002, p. 141). More-
over, codifying their knowledge and making it accessible to other people entails a loss of 
control of it that employees may be reluctant to accept.  
 
Therefore, articulated knowledge is sometimes never codified – or only incompletely so – 
and there may be considerable time lags between articulation and codification. In technology 
transfer, differences between ‘actual’ and codified knowledge can cause serious conundrum. 
This is often the case, for example, when blueprints have not been updated to reflect altera-
tions to machinery made in response to experiences of actual operating conditions. 
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EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES  
Interpretation of articulated knowledge requires both mastery of the code (language, vocabu-
lary, etc.) and an understanding of the cognitive frames (theories, mental maps) to which it 
refers. Some codes are generally learnt as part of a typical primary school curriculum, for 
example the conventions of writing the local language. But many require more advanced 
general education and yet others are learnt in specialized training programs or in actual 
practice. 
 
The precise mode of articulation – both the means and symbols and the meaning attached to 
them – is context dependent and may vary between organizations and communities (Sanchez 
1997).         
As a rule, there is no reason to presuppose that all people in the world possess the 
knowledge needed to interpret the codes properly. This means that what is codified 
for one person or group may be tacit for another and an utterly impenetrable mystery 
for a third. Thus context – temporal, spatial, cultural and social – becomes an impor-
tant consideration in any discussion of codified knowledge. (Cowan et al. 2000, p. 
225) 
Defining the context delineates the community where knowledge resides. For some purposes, 
as in Wenger’s (1998) analysis of insurance claims processors or Orr’s  (1996) studies of ser-
vice technicians, small work groups or individual departments can be seen as forming indi-
vidual ‘communities of practice’. Such communities are formed in and sustained by the 
common pursuit of a shared enterprise, a task to be accomplished (Lave and Wenger 1991; 
Brown and Duguid 1991; Wenger 1998). Interdependent practice favors the development of 
shared identity and this, in turn, may promote the exchange and integration of knowledge 
(Brown and Duguid 2001a 2001b).  
 
Through its practice, a community develops a shared understanding of what it does, of how to 
do it, and how it relates to other communities and their practices – in all a ‘world view’. This 
understanding comprises the community’s collective knowledge base. The processes of de-
veloping the knowledge and the community are significantly interdependent: the practice 
develops the understanding, which can reciprocally change the community’s practice and 
identity (Brown and Duguid 1998, p. 96). 
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As conceived in the pioneering studies of Lave and Wenger (1991), Brown and Duguid 
(1991, 1998) and Wenger (1998), communities of practice are formed through mutual 
engagement in joint enterprise and a shared repertoire of skills. Mutual engagement requires 
interaction and is therefore favored by geographical proximity. But, as Wenger (1998, p. 74) 
notes: “Given the right context, talking on the phone, exchanging electronic mail, or being 
connected by radio can all be part of what makes mutual engagement possible.” Thus, 
modern transportation and communications technologies have made it feasible to build and 
maintain communities of practice that extend over large geographical distances. This has en-
abled MNCs to integrate geographically dispersed activities and combine knowledge origi-
nating in diverse locations, using the codes and shared perspectives of professionals tied by 
membership in common communities.  
 
Importantly, people belong to several communities at the same time, some extending beyond 
organizational boundaries. Many employees, for example, identify with and maintain close 
relationships to professional communities that extend beyond their own organizations. This is 
common in many knowledge-based industries where ‘normative isomorphism’ through 
selection, socialization and training in the educational system, leads to a professional … 
… pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy similar positions across a 
range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation and disposition that may 
override variations in tradition and control that might otherwise shape organizational 
behavior. (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 152.) 
Professional communities that span organizational boundaries create and legitimize common 
codes and cognitive frames. Due to such commonalities and the development of communica-
tion technologies, knowledge sometimes travels more easily between organizations than 
within them:  
...[While] the division of labor erects boundaries within firms, it also produces ex-
tended communities that lie across the external boundaries of firms. Moving knowl-
edge among groups with similar practices and overlapping memberships can thus 
sometimes be relatively easy compared to the difficulty of moving it among heteroge-
neous groups within the firm. (Brown and Duguid 1998, p. 102). 
Sometimes such communities of practitioners are geographically concentrated, as in the case 
of the engineers developing the flat panel display industry (Murtha et al. 2001) or the com-
munities clustering in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1996). In the past, national borders often 
delimited such larger communities and their practices, but even before the advent of jet air 
travel and electronic communication geographical boundaries were not always important. 
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Scientists, for example, have long formed loose but geographically extensive communities 
(Knorr-Cetina 1999). Common pursuit of a shared scientific practice allows their members to 
communicate and collaborate over large distances, without necessarily having close personal 
contact.  
  
The semantic conventions in the inherited literature are somewhat ambiguous and it is useful, 
as Brown and Duguid (2001b) suggest, to more clearly distinguish than is usually done such 
larger communities from the smaller work groups for which the term ‘community of practice’ 
was originally applied. Following recent practice (Steinmueller 2000; Cowan et al. 2000; 
Edwards 2001; Cohendet et al. 2001), I propose use ‘epistemic community’ as a generic term 
for such communities, regardless of the geographical concentration and intensity of mutual 
contact between their members.6  
 
Epistemic Communities as Interpretation Systems 
Epistemic communities form ‘interpretation systems’ (Daft and Weick 1984). They exist in 
order to help their members interpret the world and provide meaning to their activities. Their 
‘practice’ is always (negotiated) social practice and includes both explicit and tacit compo-
nents (Wenger 1998). Epistemic communities are where knowledge resides and articulation 
and knowledge creation can take place.  
 
Epistemic communities are defined and delineated by the generation and maintenance of 
shared cognitive frames (theories, mental maps) and coding schemes (vocabulary, codes) that 
help the community and its members define and solve problems and ‘get the job done.’ 
Communities are also characterized by their inherited technology, much of which is typically 
embedded in physical artifacts of various kinds. It is in the interplay and interaction between 
these elements that articulation and codification of knowledge is possible (Figure 2). 
 
--- INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
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THE ARTICULATION CIRCLE 
With the exceptions noted above, ‘tacitness’ is not an intrinsic property of human knowledge 
but is determined by the extent to which investments in its articulation have been undertaken. 
As illustrated in the debate over the relationship between science and technology, the impetus 
sometimes comes from the emergence of new tools, sometimes through the development of 
new and more powerful codes and sometimes through the ‘independent’ development of 
theory (Figure 3). 
 
--- INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
A striking illustration is offered by McGee (1999), in his discussion of the impact of meas-
ured multiview plans (the ‘code’) on shipbuilding through the development of a coherent 
body of knowledge (the ‘theory’) regarding the relationship between various aspects of a 
ship’s physical characteristics (the ‘tool’), hull shape, displacement, weight, etc., and its 
behavior at sea: 
The most important [point]: drawings first, then science. Without the use of measured 
plans there could be nothing to quantify and so no possible application of mathemati-
cal physical theory whatsoever. The second point is that without the use of measured 
plans to achieve accuracy in construction there could be no point in applying scien-
tific theory, since there could be no point in calculating the behavior of a “paper” ship 
if the real ship was going to be built (and therefore behave) differently – especially 
not when small variations in shape are known to produce large changes in behavior. 
The third point is that what cannot get into the plans cannot get into the ship. This is 
important because it gives us definite criteria for judging the utility of physical theory. 
(McGee 1999, p.230)   
Before theories can be developed and applied to a specific problem, the problem itself must 
be defined. As Schön (1983/1996, p. 40) emphasizes, “problem setting… is not itself a tech-
nical problem.” Frequently, both the ends to be achieved and the possible means to be used 
need to be clarified. Framing the problem is the first step in a process of articulation: “Prob-
lem setting is process in which, interactively, we name the thing to which we will attend and 
frame the context in which we will attend to them” (Schön 1983/1996, p. 40, italics in the 
original). 
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Articulation depends on existing theoretical frames also because coded messages derive 
meaning only in relationship to previously acquired knowledge. As theory, myth, or mental 
models, this knowledge provides the frame-of-reference needed to transform data into mean-
ingful messages. Articulation cannot be undertaken without reference to theory and mental 
models: “Codes, and especially languages, are not neutral means to transmit knowledge. 
They include intrinsically a representation of the world and mobilize different amounts of 
cognitive resources, both for the emitter and for the receiver” (Ancori, et al. 2000, p. 268). 
 
Frequently, articulation and theory development require observations and measurements that 
can only be obtained by artificially extending the natural perception of the senses. Thus, man-
made artifacts, ‘tools’ or ‘instrumentalities’ (De Solla Price 1984), are often essential to 
articulation. Other tools serve as reservoirs of codified knowledge, e.g. books and libraries, 
blueprints and data banks. They allow knowledge to be stored, retrieved and transmitted 
between locations, thereby facilitating the accumulation and combination of knowledge. 
 
Theory 
In order to be useful, articulation requires not only the availability of a suitable code. It must 
also be accompanied by a cognitive theory or ‘frame of reference’ providing meaning to the 
information it conveys. The frame of reference to which a code appeals may itself be more or 
less articulated. The frame can be highly articulated as in the case of a scientific theory. 
However, such frames can also be tacit, such as the ones provided by the habits, conventions 
and traditions of national or organizational cultures, ‘dominant logics’ (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986) or ‘industry recipes’ (Spender, 1989).  
 
Epistemic communities share both implicit mental models and explicit cognitive schemata 
that can be more or less elaborate, ranging from simple rules of thumb to explicit theories. 
Lave and Wenger (1991), who emphasize the tacit aspects, analyze how new members 
acquire the skill of the community through situated learning in a process they described – in 
explicit analogy to the master-apprentice relationship – as ‘legitimate peripheral learning’. 
Schön (1983/1996, p. 118) uses a similar analogy: “Like the individual craftsman, the collec-
tive has a theory-in-use implicit in the norms, strategies and assumptions that govern its 
regular patterns of task performance.” 
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Tacit mental models arise from the community’s experience of solving the problems it en-
counters. As long as they help solving these problems reliably, they tend to be taken for 
granted and there is little inducement to invest in their articulation. However, since they are 
based on the range of experiences already accounted, their area of application is typically 
limited. When a group or an individual encounters new circumstances or attempts to reach 
new levels of performance, the inadequacy of inherited models may become evident.   
 
Medieval cathedral builders lacked a theory of structural mechanics but were able to con-
struct extremely complex innovative structures by means of simple rules of thumb that…   
… related sizes to spaces and heights by ratios, such as half the number of feet in a 
span expressed in inches plus one inch will give the depth of a hardwood joist. These 
rules of thumb were stated as, and learned as, ratios; for, as the span gets larger, the 
depth of the joist will too. This sort of geometry is extremely powerful. It enables the 
transportation and transmission of structural experience, it makes possible the suc-
cessful replication of a specific arrangement in different places and different circum-
stances, it reduces a wide variety or problems to a comparatively compact series of 
solutions, and it allows for a flexible rather than rigidly rule-bound response to dif-
fering problems. (Turnbull, 1993, p. 323.) 
In time, the application of these and similar rules of thumb proved inadequate to the ambition 
of architects and patrons. Like in many traditional engineering industries, a technological 
trajectory based on rules of thumb and trial-and-error methods of experimentation soon 
reached a point where desired performance improvements became progressively more diffi-
cult and eventually prohibitively costly.  
 
In this situation, communities of engineers may decide to undertake research in order to 
develop a more adequate theoretical understanding of the materials and forces involved. Indi-
vidual practitioners may similarly engage in ‘reflection-in-action’ (Schön 1983/1996) in order 
to reach a better understanding of the conditions influencing the task at hand. In both types of 
situations, the aim is to improve performance by means of knowledge articulation and the 
development of new and more powerful theory. 
 
As long as established practice continues to provide successful innovations, there is little in-
centive to engage in theoretical articulation with uncertain pay-off. Over time, however, 
problems may appear that cannot be solved with established routines. Competitive advan-
tages may then accrue to those firms that have the vision and competence to articulate prod-
uct and process technologies through application of scientific method (Senker, 1995, p. 430). 
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Codes 
Through ‘articulation’ tacit knowledge is transformed into explicit code or language, includ-
ing “...writing, mathematics, graphs and maps, diagrams and pictures, in short, all forms of 
symbolic representation which are used as language.” (Polanyi 1962, p. 78.) The inclusion of 
‘maps’ and ‘pictures’ is significant – many types of knowledge cannot easily be conveyed 
within the serial logic of mathematics and language. As Hedlund and Zander (1993, p. 10) 
note, “… the relationship between the details of a complex skill, even if articulable one by 
one, is sometimes lost in language, which – due to its serial nature – cannot simultaneously 
describe the relationships and characterize the things related.”  
 
Language – both ordinary language and more specialized varieties, such as mathematics, 
chemical formulae or computer code – and pictorial representations (“graphs and maps, dia-
grams and pictures…”) constitute basic forms of code with origins as ancient as humankind. 
As elaborated below, it is useful, although linguistically awkward, to regard physical 
artifacts, such as tools and machines, also as forms of articulated knowledge.  
 
The aims of their practice and the goals of communities have a strong influence on the codes 
they develop and employ. An interesting example is offered by the failed attempt to provide 
American shipyards with ready-made (British) plans for the construction of the Liberty 
freighter during World War II (Brown 2000). In the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
engineering cultures of the two countries had begun to diverge. For a variety of reasons, in-
cluding both the nature of demand and the cost and qualifications of available labor, British 
manufacturing firms emphasized variety and design creativity (‘innovation’), American engi-
neers were more concerned with standardization and production control (‘replication’). In 
consequence, by 1940 the mechanical drawings used in Britain were so different from those 
employed in the United States as to be literally meaningless in American shipyards.  
 
Over time, increasingly specialized and sophisticated varieties of textual and pictorial code 
have radically reduced the costs of articulation, permitting articulation of skills previously 
immune to explication. Innovations as regards the methods for producing, reproducing and 
storing text and images have revolutionized the impact of knowledge codification.  
 
Language. Most economically significant codes are explicit, but some may also have 
tacit elements. The latter include ‘patterns’ of different kinds that carry meaning although we 
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may not be able to account for precisely how this happens. In this category belong – as 
Polanyi (1962) notes – basic human capabilities such as face recognition, an ability acquired 
so early on in life that it takes on an automatic quality. But pattern recognition is also an 
important part of the skills of a professional: 
Every competent practitioner can recognize phenomena  - families of symptoms asso-
ciated with a particular disease, peculiarities of a certain kind of building site, irregu-
larities of materials or structures – for which he cannot give a reasonably accurate or 
complete description. (Schön 1983/1996, p. 49) 
As long as the tacit interpretation of such patterns produces the expected and desired out-
comes, there is usually little inducement to articulate the knowledge on which they are based. 
However, at times, unfamiliar patterns may occur that cannot readily be interpreted.  This 
may cause the practitioner to engage in ‘reflection-in-action’ (Schön 1983/1996), an attempt 
to articulate a better understanding of the conditions influencing the task at hand. Provided 
that a suitable vocabulary or code can be found, this may involve the articulation of a new 
theory or model of the phenomenon. 
 
The nature of that transformation is intimately dependent on the availability of codes. Our 
ability to name things determines not only the ease or difficulty of communicating what we 
see. It vitally affects our very perception, i.e. our ability to see things in the first place. 
Language and other codes, that we use in communication and that shape our perceptions, are 
not stable. They develop over time, allowing progressively finer distinctions in the overall 
stream of experience (Tsoukas and Vladimirou 2001). 
.  
Pictorial codes. In the early 15th century, the Renaissance inventions of chiaroscuro 
(the illusion of the third dimension through shading) and linear perspective provided standard 
conventions for the pictorial representation of three-dimensional objects (Ivins 1938/1973; 
Edgerton 1976, 1980; Ferguson 1992/2001).7 As Edgerton (1980, p. 182) notes, these con-
ventions provided a new and powerful code: “The mathematical aspect of Renaissance art 
also allowed it to be used as a special visual language, particularly when describing tangible 
objects.”  
Alberti’s perspective scheme of 1435 – 1436… provided a basis for the hitherto 
missing grammar or rules for securing both logical relations within the system of 
symbols employed and a reciprocal, or two-way, metrical correspondence between the 
pictorial representations of objects and the shapes of those objects located in space.  
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These developments – and subsequent graphic inventions such as Cartesian coordinate ge-
ometry, orthographic projections and other types of engineering drawings – produced a radi-
cal change in the ease with which visual information could be conveyed. 
 
Based on the invention of printing from woodcuts and engraved metal plates by the mid 15th 
century – together with Gutenberg’s invention of movable type around the same time – these 
new codes were crucial for both the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century and the Indus-
trial Revolution of the 18th (Ivins 1938/1973; Ferguson 1992/2001). It now became possible 
to exactly duplicate in large numbers both text and visual information, such as drawings and 
diagrams. The creation and use of pictorial symbols and associated conventions revolution-
ized the codification and transmission of both scientific and technological knowledge.  
 
Codes and epistemic communities. In theory, codified knowledge can be communicated as 
‘information.’ It is “...alienable from the person who wrote the code” and “...can be transmit-
ted without loss of integrity once the syntactical rules required for deciphering it are known” 
(Kogut and Zander 1992, p. 386 f.).  
 
However, the existence of an explicit and well-defined code does not by itself guarantee the 
efficient transfer of information. It also requires that the recipient is familiar with it and can 
decipher the message. If not, he/she must invest in learning the code of the message, or the 
message needs to be translated into a different code. Both solutions require conscious and 
costly effort and will only be undertaken if the perceived gain is high enough. 
 
Moreover, communities-of-practice tend to develop idiosyncratic coding schemes, reflecting 
their common, partly tacit, interpretation of the world and their own roles within it. As noted 
already in Allen’s (1977) classic study, idiosyncratic coding schemes often enhance the 
efficiency of communication among community members but impede, sometimes intention-
ally, communication with ‘outsiders’. Like other aspects of organizational culture, local codes 
tend to be taken for granted and their mastery is largely tacit. Idiosyncratic codes frequently 
aggravates the problem of communication across organizational boundaries:  
 
Tools 
The term ‘tool’ is here used in its broadest meaning to denote all the various types of man-
made artifacts that communities use or produce in the course of their practice. Tools are sig-
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nificance for the articulation process in both immediate and indirect ways. Following Rogers 
(1983, p. 2), three classes of tools can be distinguished, differing in the way they allow man 
to transform the physical world:  
 
Many tools increase the efficiency of the body. This includes a wide variety of tools, ranging 
from simple hand tools to numerically controlled machine tools and robots, but also trans-
portation equipment and housing, for example. Like all man made objects, they are signifi-
cant here because they embody knowledge – both tacit and otherwise – that went into their 
making.    
 
A second class of tools serves to increase the efficiency of the senses via instruments that 
permit measurements of not directly perceivable phenomena or with greater precision and 
reliability than possible by mere sense perception. Such instrumentalities (de Solla Price 
1984) serve the articulation process by providing data necessary for the formulation, testing 
and refinement of theoretical models. 
 
Finally, there are tools that increase the power of the human intellect as aids to memory, 
intelligence and communication. Such memory tools are of special significance in the present 
context since they serve as media for the codification, storage and transmission of articulated 
knowledge.  
 
Embodied knowledge. All human artifacts, from the simplest hand tools to advanced 
rocketry, embody the knowledge – both tacit and explicit – that was employed in their 
making. “The artifact often is an exemplar of that knowledge, and can sometimes be thought 
of as a ‘container’ or ‘storage vessel’ for it…” (Cowan et al. 2000, p. 229 f.).  
 
The transfer of embodied technologies increases the skill of the recipient but does not neces-
sarily imply the transfer of the underlying cognitive elements. In the simplest case, the use of 
the artifact is self-explanatory, requiring no or only limited prior knowledge on part of the 
receiver. Argote (1999, p. 69 f.), for example, relates the rapid diffusion within a chain of 
pizza stores of a ‘cheese spreader’ – a tool to help ensure the even distribution of grated 
cheese on pizzas. Effective use of a ‘cheese spreader’ – like that of a personal computer – 
requires no understanding of the embodied technological principles.  
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In many instances, such understanding may be irrelevant for the user whose primary interest 
is the application of the artifact and who may be totally ignorant of manufacturing principles 
employed in its production. Being incidental to their primary purpose, the knowledge 
embodied in artifacts often has strong tacit elements. Nevertheless, an observer belonging to 
the relevant community of practice and versed in the appropriate production technologies 
may through observation and reverse engineering be able to ‘decode’ the artifact and lay bare 
the knowledge used in its design and production. 
 
Instrumentalities. Articulation and theory development frequently require access to 
quantitative measurements of phenomena not readily available to natural perception or 
requiring a level of precision that cannot be obtained without the aid of dedicated 
instruments.  Both for the development and testing of new theory, such measuring tools, 
‘instrumentalities’, are often required. Vincenti’s account of the articulation of ‘flying 
qualities’ offers a good illustration: 
The capability at Langley depended crucially on new instrumentation. Warner and 
Norton’s first instruments were primitive: standard altimeter, tachometer, and air-
speed meter, plus a graduated sector attached to the rocker arm of the control stick for 
elevator angle and a ring grip on the control column for stick force. The pilot or 
observer hurriedly recorded the readings on a kneepad. (Vincenti 1990, p. 70)  
The causal relationship between instrumentalities and the articulation of theory is not 
unidirectional. Modeling the double helix structure of DNA critically depended on Rosalind 
Franklin’s techniques to produce X-ray diffraction pictures (Watson 1968). However, it was 
almost a century after the publication of the Principia that Atwood invented an apparatus to 
empirically demonstrate the workings of Newton’s second law (Kuhn 1977, p. 189).   
 
Memory Tools. Artifacts are significant, first of all, because of their material proper-
ties – they can be stored and transported and are therefore able to bridge both time and space. 
Many – such as archives and data banks – are obviously created precisely for these reasons. 
However, the same is true for all objects used and produced in the process of knowledge 
codification: printed paper, blueprints, computer hardware, etc.  
 
The templates used in the building of 13th century Gothic cathedrals offer an early example. 
Without the benefit of precise measurements, scale plans or theory of structural mechanics, 
portable templates, embodying geometrical rules of thumb, provided the powerful means by 
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which complex knowledge was replicated and transmitted, facilitating accurate mass produc-
tion and the coordination of a large number of workers:  
The template helps to make possible the unified organization of large numbers of men 
with varied training and skill over considerable periods of time…. In addition to the 
power to organize large numbers of workers, templates have the power to allow for 
greater exactness of stone cutting and enabled a stable, enduring, and coherent struc-
ture, despite a discontinuous process and radical design changes…. The template… 
provides a structure whose stability is achieved despite the lack of what we would 
take to be the basic essentials for producing the specifications for a particular element 
in a building, a common and precise mode of measurement, a knowledge of structural 
mechanics, and a detailed scale plan. (Turnbull 1993, pp. 322 f.) 
Numerically controlled machine tools offer a modern day example. Complex metal cutting, 
for example, is slow and difficult when performed manually but can be coded with relative 
ease and ensured precision. And, once coded, the commands can be stored and the task need 
not be analyzed again.  
 
The principle operates not only in the articulation of technical knowledge. It applies equally 
in the operational record keeping through which organizations create ‘memories’ independent 
of individuals. Quoting Chandler (1977), Bowker and Star (1999, p. 255 f.) discuss how 
organizations use classification schemes “to selectively forget about the past in the process of 
producing knowledge”.  
 
Tools as boundary objects. Since they are not tied in space and time, some artifacts 
serve as boundary objects, (Star and Griesemer 1989), i.e. “…objects that both inhabit 
several communities of practice and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them. 
In working practice, they are objects that are able both to across borders and maintain some 
sort of constant identity” (Bowker and Star 1999, p. 16). They are significant because few 
articulation projects take place solely within the confines of one community; most involve 
interaction and exchange of knowledge between communities. They are significant also 
because they facilitate coordinated action without requiring members of different 
communities to align their understanding of each other’s knowledge. 
 
Modern computer and information systems are pervasive examples of boundary objects. 
Their effects are important not only because they facilitate integration and new combinations 
of knowledge, but also because they create inducements to articulate knowledge in standard-
ized code:    
 22
Creating Knowledge: The Power and Logic of Articulation 
If new knowledge is explicit, or if tacit knowledge can be articulated in explicit form, 
then integrating knowledge does not pose major difficulties. In designing its 777 pas-
senger plane, Boeing was able to greatly extend its knowledge of electronics and new 
materials through an advanced CAD system which provided a common language for 
specialists across widely different knowledge areas and different companies to com-
municate and integrate. (Grant 1996b, p. 382) 
 
THE BENEFITS OF ARTICULATION  
Articulation and Knowledge Creation 
Articulation – the conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge – is fundamental to knowledge 
creation and innovation. Indeed, it is a prerequisite for rapid and cumulative learning. Of 
course, learning can also take place without suitable codes and vocabularies – as when base-
ball pitchers learn to ‘find the groove’ (Schön 1983/1996, p. 54). However, such learning is 
slow, cumbersome and difficult to pass on to others. In consequence, the state-of-the-art of 
the community of baseball players advances only slowly over time.  Joe DiMaggio, would 
still command a handsome reward in the World Series. In contrast, the alpine skiers of by-
gone days would only with difficulty qualify for a spot in the World Cup. Here, learning has 
been rapid and cumulative because it has been articulated and embedded in new materials and 
shapes of skiing equipment. As Adler and Cole (1993) illustrate, the same principle operates 
in industrial production plants.  
 
Ever since the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, we have seen a continuous trend 
away from the experiential and tacit rules of craftsmen towards articulated substantive and 
operative theories of technology (Bunge 1966). Modern technology is unthinkable without 
codification.  
 
The trend towards increasing articulation is perhaps most obvious and pervasive in science 
and engineering, but, as noted above, it has also been a force in the development of modern 
management techniques, at least since the mid 19th century. Before this time, business firms 
tended to keep few records other than accounts and business correspondence (Chandler 1977; 
Yates 1989). The lack of codification paralleled that in production, the knowledge of which 
was largely tacit:  
In the early nineteenth century, organizational memory in American firms consisted 
of the memories of individuals, simple routines, and very limited records. Most firms 
were managed by their owners, who carried much of the knowledge of business 
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methods and past successes and failures in their heads. These owner/managers/ were 
often aided by skilled artisans, who in turn carried most of the knowledge of technical 
methods in their heads and hands. Both owners and skilled employees applied their 
knowledge through simple standard procedures and through oral orders. This knowl-
edge could be passed on only by prolonged apprenticeship, either technical or mana-
gerial. (Yates 1990, p. 173)    
By the early 1900s, the traditional reliance (and dependence) of firms on the skills and 
memories of individuals (both owner/managers and employees) was increasingly replaced by 
written records, reports and manuals, codifying organizational rules and procedures. The in-
troduction of ‘systematic management’ reflected an attempt  “…to transcend dependence 
upon the skills, memory, or capacity of any single individual” but also “an attempt to rise 
above the concrete details of the task to think about what is being done, rather than merely to 
do it” (Jelinek 1980, p. 64, italics added).  
 
This is not meant to suggest that in the modern world there are no traditional industries char-
acterized by highly tacit technologies, nor that modern, ‘science-based’ industries are totally 
independent of such knowledge. Many of the skills of managers and much of the creativity 
underlying new innovations are, by their very nature, unarticulable. However, the argument 
does mean to imply that, if at all, such tacit elements develop only very slowly over time. 
Articulation is the primary force in knowledge creation and the formation of new capabilities.  
 
The Costs and Benefits of Articulation 
Articulation and codification of tacit knowledge have several fundamental benefits, which 
together help to account for the technical, scientific and economic progress of human civili-
zation since the invention of writing by the Sumerians around 3000 BC. Historically, the 
combined and cumulative effects of new codes, new theory and new tools have made possi-
ble the articulation of ever-larger areas of knowledge. Lately, advances in the fields of elec-
tronics, computer science and scientific instruments have dramatically increased the range 
skills and knowledge amenable to articulation while simultaneously drastically reducing the 
associated costs. Of course, their impact on the production, replication, dissemination and 
storage of codified knowledge has been no less dramatic. 
 
Once they are available, new codes often make possible the development of new models and 
new theory. New models, in turn, may lead to the refinement of existing codes or the creation 
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of new ones. However, articulation always requires effort, especially when both codes and 
methods of measurements must first be invented and developed.  
 
The decision as to whether or not to engage in articulation and incur the associated invest-
ments will be determined by the expected benefits, the value attached to these benefits and by 
the cost and effort required. (Sanchez 1997; Cowan et al. 2000). The effort will only be 
undertaken and the costs will only be incurred if they are expected to generate benefits in 
excess of these costs.  
 
This is not to say that the process can be described as “an exercise in equilibrating marginal 
benefits and costs” (Johnson, et al., p. 257), nor can we assume that an equilibrium exist 
where no further benefits from articulation can be expected. In an evolutionary context, it is 
not difficult to imagine that fully rational economic agents may have an incentive to continu-
ously increase the degree of codification of their knowledge. Indeed, outside the realm of 
neo-classical economic models, this would appear to be the rule rather than the exception.  
 
Moreover, articulation and the development of new codes are not always and exclusively re-
sponses to rational economic calculation. The development of linear perspective and the 
geometrical quantitative qualities of Renaissance art have been traced to the thirteenth cen-
tury cult of St. Francis which inspired painters to revive ancient Greek and Roman traditions 
in an effort to render the holy myths as realistically as possible (Edgerton 1980, p. 184 ff.). 
 
Thus, decisions as to whether or not to engage in codification reflect not only economic in-
centives but also inherited, culturally based value- and belief-systems. In Europe, Protestant 
printers and Protestant ideology were instrumental in opening the way for the Scientific 
Revolution and in overcoming the alliance between the theology of the Catholic Church and 
the teachings of Aristotle (Eisenstein 1983). In China – in spite of the potential of Mohist 
logic and Taoist natural insight – Confucian dominance prevented a similar unfolding of 
scientific thinking (Needham 1978).  
 
Beliefs, attitudes and habits also affect the articulation activities of modern-day organiza-
tions. Some tend to attach more value to articulation than do others (Wright 1997). R&D 
units, for example, differ strongly in this respect. Some are strongly ‘normatively-oriented’ 
(Hofstede et al. 1990; Håkanson 1995), aiming for a scientific/theoretical understanding of 
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production processes. They tend to have tight control systems, reflected in stringent standards 
for quality control and documentation. Others are much more ‘pragmatic’ and consider such 
understanding superfluous as long as the processes deliver the right quality of product in ap-
propriate quantities. They tend to view articulation activities and codification systems as 
bureaucratic and wastefully time consuming   
 
Hence, the conditions and inducements for undertaking the investment necessary for articu-
lation have differed over time and differ between contexts. Although interrelated, three broad 
categories of benefits can be identified: innovation, division of labor, and replication and 
control.  
 
Innovation. One of the most powerful effects of articulation is to enhance the possi-
bilities for experimentation and innovation.  In the absence of codification, there is no sym-
bolic means to predict whether a new design will work. The only way to find out is to build 
and subject it to actual conditions of use. Should the design fail, the time, work and materials 
involved may have been wasted. In consequence, craft production is inherently conservative, 
characterized by a very slow rate of innovation and change (McGee 1999).  
 
As already noted, articulation can never fully retain the richness of completeness of the origi-
nal skill. However, precisely because it conveys only a part of the original knowledge – 
articulation helps focus attention on its critical aspects. This accounts for the power of draw-
ings as a method of design: “Articulation pictures the essentials of a situation on a reduced 
scale, which lends itself more easily to imaginative manipulation than the ungainly original; it 
thereby makes possible the science of engineering.” (Polanyi 1962, p. 85, italics added)  
 
The emergence of modern methods of engineering – “the shift from craftsmanship to drafts-
manship” – was made possible by the Renaissance development of linear perspective and the 
use of drawings as a method of design (Ferguson 1992/2001; McGee, 1999). Already in the 
early 15th century, Taccola and his contemporaries were exploiting the new conventions of 
pictorial representation, such as the ‘exploded view’ and the “transparent view” to design 
machines solely by means of drawings, without having to find a patron to finance expensive 
constructions (Edgerton 1980, p. 195).  
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The method of ‘design-by-drawing’, was later extended to the use of measured drawings, 
specifying the dimensions of products before their actual production. This accelerated the rate 
of innovation by allowing designers/inventors to experiment with the geometrical aspects of a 
proposed design without the costs and effort of altering the product itself. The mastery of 
drawings as a means of experimentation and of mathematics as the language of technology is 
a distinguishing feature of the modern engineer (Petroski 1996, pp. 89 f.). 
 
Articulation also increases the level of complexity that can be managed. Codification makes 
it possible to ‘chunk’, store and communicate technological knowledge. This too is exempli-
fied in the use of drawings which enabled engineers and designers to deal with a hitherto 
“unmanageable, and unimaginable, degree of complexity” (McGee 1999, p. 28), unmatched 
until the advent of Computer Aided Design.  
 
Division of labor. A further primary benefit of articulation is to facilitate the division 
of labor. Traditional craft production is undifferentiated and continuous with little or no divi-
sion of labor. Artifacts are created without explicit design, using techniques that are largely 
tacit. The passing on of these techniques is time consuming and therefore costly. Time spent 
in instruction detracts from time in production. This limits the number of apprentices that a 
master can supervise at any one time and, thereby, his opportunity to exploit advantages of 
specialization and division of labor. In pre-industrial Europe, these limits were reinforced by 
the institutional setting of the time, e.g. in the rules of guilds and the moral sanctions of the 
church. 
 
The introduction of drawings as a method of design had consequences also for the division of 
labor. It allowed a separation between design and production; these activities could now be 
undertaken at different times, by different people and at different geographical locations. 
Moreover, the use of measured drawings made it possible to devise, plan and execute projects 
– such as large ships or buildings – that were too big for a single craftsman to make. 
 
Equally important, by enhancing division of labor and specialization, articulation can lead to 
dramatic improvements in productivity. The advantage of time-and-motion studies in the sci-
entific management tradition of Fredrick W. Taylor was not only the increased productivity 
of the individual worker. At least as important was the transformation of work itself, from 
skilled or semi-skilled craft production to unskilled manufacturing jobs.  
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For firms, the combination of deskilling and increasing division of labor created benefits both 
through substantial savings in labor cost and through reduced dependence on skilled artisans. 
In the short run, of course, these changes negatively affected both organized labor and indi-
vidual workmen (Braverman 1974). However, in a longer perspective, articulation and codi-
fication provided the basis for automation, rationalization and other technologies permitting 
increases in labor productivity and wages far outweighing the workers’ momentary loss of 
power and income.     
 
Replication and control. A common incentive for articulation and codification is to 
reduce the cost of capability replication. This applies, for example, to the acquisition of firm 
specific skills by new employees. Time spent in acquiring tacit organizational knowledge is 
unproductive and costly. Any reduction of this time period can clearly bring considerable 
savings.  
 
Another common case of capability replication is technology transfer to licensees, joint ven-
ture partners or wholly owned subsidiaries. Empirical research has shown that the costs for 
such transfers are often considerable, depending on factors such as the sender’s experience 
with prior transfers and with the technology, the skills and experience of the receiver and the 
characteristics of the technology itself, notably its degree of codification. (Teece 1977; 
Contractor 1981; Kogut and Zander 1993; Zander and Kogut 1995).  
 
A related reason for articulation is to improve ‘control’, i.e. the precision and reliability with 
which a particular organizational routine can be performed. The quest for increasing control 
is the dominating theme in the seminal works of Beniger (1986) on the historical develop-
ment of information technologies and Yates (1989) on the ‘systematic management’ move-
ment. Although not framed in these terms, both can be read as pioneering studies in the 
power and logic of articulation.   
 
Following Chandler (1977), Yates (1989) describes, for example, how, in the mid 19th cen-
tury, the need to reliably manage, coordinate and control geographically dispersed operations 
led American railroads to pioneer major innovations in cost accounting, planning procedures 
and operational reporting. Explication and codification of organizational procedures remain 
central to controlled replication and ‘quality management’ – they are important elements, for 
example, in ISO 900x certification.  
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Articulation and Politics 
As in the case of technical progress generally, articulation may bring benefits to some and 
costs to others. Braverman (1974, p.18) recalls Marx’ famous statement:  
Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new pro-
ductive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of 
production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social 
relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill, society 
with the industrial capitalist. (Marx, n. d., p. 92 in Braverman 1974, p. 18) 
The Marxist tradition emphasizes the alienation and exploitation of the working class as the 
primary effects of articulation and technical change: “The more science is incorporated into 
the labor process, the less the worker understands of the process; the more sophisticated an 
intellectual product the machine becomes, the less control and comprehension of the machine 
the worker has” (Braverman 1974, p. 73). 
 
By the mid 19th century, the introduction of engineering drawings following standardized 
conventions radically changed the balance of power between managers and workers. They 
reduced the discretion of foremen in the shops by transferring decisions to the drafting rooms, 
from where complete specifications were issued according to which work was to be done:  
The transformation that occurred in most European and American shops in the nine-
teenth century was from a world in which engineers negotiated with workers who had 
traditionally used the judgment of their trades to a world in which matters of judgment 
were settled by pencils on paper in drafting rooms remote from the shop floor. The 
removal of all discretionary power was neither sudden nor uncontested, but within a 
few decades the center of authority in engineering work was clearly located in engi-
neering drawings. (Ferguson 1992/2001, p. 102) 
Articulation, like innovation and technological progress, almost always entails a redistribu-
tion of knowledge and skills.  It has repercussions both on the equilibrium conditions in the 
economy and on the power balance of the social systems it affects. The articulation of the 
traditional, and largely tacit knowledge concerning the delivery of babies has brought a 
power shift from (predominantly female) midwives to (predominantly male) physicians – 
legitimated by the associated reduction in infant mortality rates. Articulation is not only an 
economic process with economic consequences; it is often a more or less intensely political 
process with substantial social consequences. Indeed, it is worthy of study not only because 
of its economic effects but also because of its social and political consequences. 
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
According to Winter (1987), in deciding whether or not to invest in the articulation and codi-
fication of knowledge, firms face a fundamental dilemma.  Whereas the advantages of reduc-
ing the costs of voluntary replication and transfer of capabilities encourage articulation and 
codification, such articulation increases the risk of involuntary transfer, imitation. The idea 
that voluntary replication and involuntary imitation are catoptric problems has found wide 
acceptance and has been influential both in shaping recent theoretical attempts to construct a 
knowledge based theory of the firm and in the development of the resource based view of 
strategy.  
 
The argument outlined above suggests a number of significant caveats to this line of reason-
ing. These pertain to the role of tacitness for replication, both voluntary and involuntary, and 
for the nature of the tradeoff between the advantages and disadvantages of articulation.  
Recognition of the roles of different kinds of epistemic communities as the locales where 
knowledge resides and as agents of articulation and knowledge creation has implications also 
for the role of knowledge in ‘resource based’ versions of the theory of the firm. 
  
The Role of Tacit Knowledge for Competitive Advantage 
Tacitness and replication. Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence lend good 
support to the proposition that – all things equal – the cost and difficulty of capability repli-
cation decrease with its degree of articulation and codification of the underlying knowledge. 
Technology transfers that can be effected through the mere transmission of an artifact or a set 
of blueprints are clearly much less expensive than ones requiring the personal engagement of 
experts in design modifications or on-the-job training. Hence, the attractiveness of investing 
in articulation increases with the frequency of transfer.  
 
The results of Zander and Kogut (1995) are often taken as evidence that the speed of (vol-
untary) transfer is dependent on the degree of tacitness of the technological skills involved. 
But as they point out, there are good reasons to suppose that the causality is reversed; the 
sooner and the more often a firm attempts to transfer its technology to a new site, the stronger 
its inducements to incur the costs and effort of its articulation (cf. Simonin 1999).  
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However, articulation of knowledge into explicit and well-defined code does not by itself 
guarantee the efficient transfer of capabilities. It also requires that the recipient be familiar 
with it, i.e. versed in the language and theoretical worldviews of the relevant epistemic com-
munity. The cost of transfers depends both on the absorptive capacity of the recipient (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990) and on the type of skill or capability that the transfer aims to provide 
(Hayami and Ruttan 1971). 
 
Tacitness and Imitation. The relationship between articulation and imitation is far 
less clear. The threat of imitation and the mechanisms available to reduce this threat varies 
considerably between industries (Levin et al. 1987). The question as to whether or not 
articulation of knowledge increases the risk of imitation cannot be answered without refer-
ence to such differences in appropriability regimes (Teece 1987).  
 
Although codified knowledge is more difficult to protect against theft and industrial espio-
nage (Winter 1987, p.173; Boisot 1995, p. 47), there is little reason to believe that articula-
tion per se substantially increases the risk of imitation or ‘leakage’. Indeed, in Zander’s study 
(Zander 1991; Zander and Kogut 1995), the degree of codifiability and articulability of manu-
facturing technology was found to be negatively, albeit not significantly, related to the risk of 
early imitation. McEvily and Chakravarthy (2002) found that ‘tacitness’ increased the time to 
imitation for major product innovations but that it significantly decreased it for minor product 
improvements.   
 
There are several reasons why articulation of knowledge need not increase the hazard of imi-
tation. First, articulated knowledge is available only to communities who master the code and 
the theoretical context needed to interpret the message. Second, articulated knowledge serve 
to inform the exercise of a skill.  Usually, performance improves with practice and experi-
ence. Having access to the same codified knowledge does not automatically imply skilled 
execution of the practice that it informs (Winter and Szulanski 2001). As Johnson et al. 
(2002, p. 251) put it: “There will always remain irreducible differences between the skills of 
a heart surgeon and the code-book she uses.”  
 
Moreover, firms have many means to restrict access to codified knowledge (Liebeskind 
1996). Blueprints and computer codes can be (and are) routinely locked away in company 
safes, employment contracts restrict employees’ freedom to disclose proprietary information 
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also after leaving the firm, etc. As Sanchez (1997, p. 173) point out, Boeing’s design algo-
rithms and procedures for aircraft simulation have been articulated and codified in computer 
software. However, strict security has prevented the leakage of this knowledge to competi-
tors.  
 
In Zander’s (1991) study, the factor most strongly increasing the hazard of imitation was ‘key 
employee turnover.’  Knowledge leakage through the loss of experienced personnel is clearly 
an important threat. However – again excepting the possibility of direct theft – the magnitude 
of this risk appears to be independent of the degree of articulation of the knowledge in ques-
tion. Individuals possess and can reveal both tacit and explicit knowledge.  
 
However, as soon as knowledge becomes embodied in a product or other physical artifact it 
can frequently be imitated.8 However, contrary to a common assumption, the ease with which 
this can be done is largely independent of the degree of articulation of the relevant design and 
manufacturing skills. It is primarily determined by the extent to which the relevant epistemic 
community extends beyond the boundaries of individual firms. In many industries, also ones 
characterized by highly tacit knowledge and practices, the mere demonstration that a par-
ticular product design is indeed feasible is sufficient to induce imitation.  
 
The Advantages and Disadvantages of Articulation. As argued above, most forms 
of economically relevant knowledge can be articulated. Whether or not articulation will take 
place will be determined by the expected benefits, the value attached to these benefits and by 
the cost and effort required. The benefits include (1) the speeding up of innovation and 
knowledge creation, (2) advantages associated with division of labor (specialization, 
economies of scale, etc.), and (3) improved capabilities for replication and control (quality 
control, growth and technology transfer, etc). These benefits are typically large in relation to 
the costs and efforts required, especially – but not only – in modern science-based industries. 
Only on rare occasions will rational firms forgo these benefits to maintain the (largely 
imaginary) protection against imitation afforded by the tacitness of its knowledge.  
   
Knowledge in the Theory of the Firm 
The framework outlined above focuses on epistemic communities as the locus of both crea-
tion and exploitation of knowledge. It is in the mutual engagement in a common enterprise, 
that groups of people develop, maintain and nurture the codes, tools and theories necessary 
 32
Creating Knowledge: The Power and Logic of Articulation 
for the articulation and development of skills and capabilities. Epistemic communities pro-
vide conditions favoring communication and knowledge flows both through commonalities 
of language (‘code’) and worldviews (‘theory’) and by fostering the shared identities and 
trust necessary that facilitate cooperation and knowledge exchange. 
 
The characteristics and configuration of the epistemic communities to which its members 
belong define the knowledge structure of the firm. ‘The firm’ itself cannot usefully be 
modeled as the locus of knowledge creation and learning. Rather than as single, seamless 
entities, firms consist of a number, possibly a large number, of epistemic communities and 
subcultures (Martin 1992). The ways in which these interact and the degree of antagonism or 
compatibility between their ‘world-views’ are matters that can only be established empiri-
cally; they cannot be determined by a priori reasoning alone. As Brown and Duguid, (2001b) 
note: 
… [W]hile accepting that firms may provide some degree of common culture for their 
members, it seems important to consider, for example, how much a CEO and a tech-
nician in a large Fortune 500 company really have in common, As accounts of social 
networks and occupational communities indicate, both are likely to have more in 
common with their peers in other organizations than with many of the other employ-
ees in their own. Brown and Duguid, (2001b, p. 201) 
Accepting communities of practice as the critical locus for identity formation and knowledge 
creation brings back into focus the classic problem of how organizations can integrate differ-
entiated units (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Brown and Duguid 2001a; Grant 1996, 2001). We 
need to move away from the utterly implausible idea that simply being employed by the same 
legal entity (‘the firm’) places people in a privileged position as regards the creation and 
exchange of knowledge (Brown and Duguid 2001b). As both casual observation and empiri-
cal research (Szulanski 1996) testify, except in very small organizations, this notion is 
patently unrealistic (Soo et al. 2002, p. 140 f.). 
 
Real world firms, especially large MNCs, are more often characterized by rivalry, mutual 
distrust or even hostility between its constituents, than by cooperation and harmonious 
pursuit of common objectives. To the extent that the latter situation occurs, it is the result of 
hard managerial work and, often costly, coordination mechanisms (Brown and Duguid 
2001b; Grant 1996, 2001). 
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In this conceptualization, firms gain competitive advantage, first, by accessing and nurturing 
the epistemic communities where critical knowledge is available or is being created, and, 
second, by their abilities to integrate and exploit this knowledge. Certain epistemic 
communities are geographically clustered and geographical proximity may confer 
competitive advantage by privileged access to scarce talent and other specialized resources. 
However, most articulation and knowledge creation takes place within firms, and its 
practitioners may thereby obtain certain unique capabilities.  
 
These may include largely tacit creative skills. But more importantly, such capabilities are 
largely based on articulated theoretical insights and otherwise codified knowledge, assets 
capable of accumulation and therefore potential sources of sustainable competitive advan-
tage. In the words of  (Dierickx and Cool 1989, p. 1507),  “… historical success translates 
into favourable asset stock positions which in turn facilitate further asset accumulation.”       
 
Charismatic leadership and creative engineering talent are certainly scarce, valuable and dif-
ficult-to-imitate resources (Barney 1991). But not being susceptible to articulation, they 
develop only slowly over time. In much recent literature, the economic significance of tacit 
knowledge has been oversimplified and misunderstood. As outlined in this paper, new 
knowledge creation takes place through articulation, in the interactive development of new 
codes, new tools and new theory. More research is needed on the conditions affecting this 
process and its social and economic effects.   
                                                 
1 Plato’s definition is not unproblematic (c.f. Gettier 1963) but will have to do for the present purpose. 
2 The human ability to perform a task without being focally aware of the underlying knowledge seems to be the 
basis for the curious idea that through ‘internalization’ (Nonaka 1991; Hedlund and Nonaka 1993; Hedlund 
1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) or ‘absorption’ (Boisot 1995; Boisot, et al. 1997) explicit knowledge can be 
re-converted into tacit knowledge.   
3 Although, as my baby daughter reminds me, the latter are, strictly speaking, acquired skills. 
4 As elaborated below, providing focus on the essential (and ignoring the rest) is, in fact, usually one of the 
benefits of articulation. Weick (1999, p. 42) notes that,  “… in order for people to make sense of something, 
they often have to ignore much that others might notice. Reality is not so much discovered as buried in the 
interest of sensemaking. To make sense is to focus on a limited set of cues, and to elaborate those cues into a 
plausible, pragmatic, momentarily useful guide for actions…”  
5 Not coincidentally, Eisenstein (1983) regards ‘standardization’, ‘dissemination’ and ‘fixity’ as the distinguish-
ing characteristics of modern ‘print culture,’ based on the invention of moveable type and the possibility to pre-
cisely repeat word symbols in exact repeatable order. As Ivins point out, a similar revolution had occurred 
nearly a hundred years’ earlier with the discovery of means to print exactly repeatable pictorial statements: “The 
exact repetition of pictorial statements has had incalculable effects upon knowledge and thought, upon science 
and technology, of every kind.”  (Ivins 1953/1969, p. 3) 
6 The concept was first developed in the field of international relations (Haas 1992) to denote communities 
whose members (1) share a common set of values and beliefs, (2) have common theoretical understanding 
regarding causalities regarding policy measures and desired outcomes, (3) have shared criteria for validity, and 
(4) pursue the same policy enterprise.     
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7 Since they do not show distortions in measurements, drawings in axonometric or isometric perspective are 
more suitable to many engineering applications, such as specifying dimensions of objects to be produced. How-
ever, perspective drawings are superior in depicting the relationships of parts in a complex whole. “Perhaps…” 
Edgerton (1976, p 79) speculates, “… the axonometric drawing enabled the Chinese to jump ahead of the West 
in technology during the Middle Ages; but linear perspective surely enabled the West to move from technology 
to a genuine scientific revolution after the Renaissance.”   
8 Sanchez (1997, p. 173), quoting Gilder (1989) cites the example of early microprocessor design, the tacit 
aspects of which were articulated by Professor Carver Mead, to be subsequently incorporated in computer soft-
ware. Today, such software makes possible the design of microprocessors far beyond the capabilities of the 
human mind. 
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FIGURE 1.  
Skills, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge 
 
DATA ACTIONCODES
TOOLS
THEORY
 
FIGURE 2.  
The Functional Elements of Epistemic Communities (adapted from Daft and Weick 1984). 
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FIGURE 3.  
The Articulation Circle 
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